A Point One Should Perhaps Not Make Too Much Of

I've looked for parallels or similarities between Nietzsche and Aristotle as I read the De Anima last semester and as I've reread Beyond Good and Evil this month. Some things have suggested themselves to me: the similarity between "potency" and "power," "energy" and "power," or "the nutritive" and "the will to power"; the similarity between Aristotle's point that the nutritive exists in potency in all of the other potencies of the soul and Nietzsche's point that one's sexuality extends throughout one's soul, even into one's highest spirituality; the similarity between Aristotle's speaking of the different potencies as different souls and Nietzsche's flat assertion that our soul is really many souls; and the similarity between Aristotle's point about the identity of the being-at-work of the perceiver and the being-at-work of the perceived thing and Nietzsche's assertion that the truth is his truth (not in a liberal, democratic sense, but in a kingly sense filled with the "pathos of distance" between the philosopher and the rest of us). Other suggestions have flitted in and out of my mind without my recording them; they won't come back to me until something stimulates the recollection, I'm sure. Just yesterday, though, it occurred to me that although of course Beyond Good and Evil is not the De Anima, the soul as it's described in the De Anima is beyond good and evil.